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GLOBALIZATION AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF MARKET 
             POLITICAL ECONOMIES 
                Shmuel N. EISENSTADT 
                 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
       The breakdown of communist regimes and the transition from centralized 
      planned to market economics bring us back to one of the most central pro-
       blems of studies of modernity, modernity and contemporary society. Do 
      they indeed foretell the "end of history", the ultimate victory of a uniform 
       liberal-market society to be perhaps threatened by ethnic or national 
      upheavals, but beyond this marking in the direction of growing con-
       vergence-convergence of modern, industrial societies. 
I 
We all remember the famous theory of the convergence of industrial societies pro-
pounded in the early 1960s by Claneker and others. This is a propitious moment to 
look at these theories again. What do recent experiences and problems tell us about 
them and the nature of the contemporary international - or rather global - scene? I 
use the term `global' advisedly, because we now have a growing globalization of in-
terrelations and influences that cannot be understood simply in terms of interactions 
between national societies and state apparatuses. 
II 
To elucidate these questions let us consider first the transformations now taking 
place simultaneously in Western and Eastern Europe. The two processes seem to be 
going in almost opposite directions. On the one hand we see in Western Europe a 
slight movement in the direction of unification. This is a peaceful movement, with 
relatively little violence, although there is quite a lot of political struggle associated 
with the various steps towards unification. In Eastern Europe the trend seems to be 
the opposite, sometimes with very unpleasant and bloody manifestations of 
disintegration. 
     As the same time there are some similarities between the processes in Eastern 
and Western Europe. One of the similarities, of course, is that the economies of 
Eastern Europe are - seemingly - moving in the direction of so-called market 
economies, i.e. in the same direction as Western Europe (I shall return to the ap-
parent nature of this trend later). This is only part of the truth, however; the full pic-
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ture is much more complicated. Despite the movement of East and West in different 
directions (greater federalization in Western Europe, the breakdown of federaliza-
tion in Eastern Europe), I believe they share some common roots, which are basical-
ly the roots of European Western modernity in its various guises. 
     In my opinion the communist regimes should not be considered as a sort of 
autocratic ancien regime. They were modern regimes, but of a special type. This has 
been my firm belief since long before the breakdown. I used to shock colleagues by 
telling them that the old Soviet Union was basically almost a democratic state. Did it 
not have a constitution and elections? When people started to laugh, I asked them 
the following question: "Why were the Czars not in favor of having a constitution or 
elections, and why did the Soviets institute both and then regulate and control them 
in a very brutal way?" The answer, of course, is that the whole mode of legitimation 
was different. The legitimation of the Soviet regime was modern, the Jacobin mirror 
image, in a sense, of the legitimating arrangements in Western Europe. Jacobin 
elements exists in the West, of course, in different guises. 
     Another common factor in these regimes in both East and West was that they 
established, in different but not entirely contradictory ways, fairly clear boundaries 
for society and the state. These boundaries were opposite in many ways, but they 
were composed of similar components, albeit organized differently. What we see to-
day, and this is a very important common element in the processes in both East and 
West, is that these boundaries, constructed in the nineteenth and especially the twen-
tieth century, are now being radically transformed. Seemingly, again, entirely 
differently in the West and the East. 
     The nation state, which was the epitome of these boundaries in Western and 
Central Europe, is weakening; it is not disappearing. To talk of the disappearance 
of the nation state is an exaggeration. At the same time there is no doubt that the 
boundaries are changing quite radically. The same is true of the boundaries of the 
former communist regimes. First of all, the `communist empire', whatever we may 
call it, has changed. The internal boundaries, not only geographic but also political 
and social, are changing greatly. 
     The transformation in Eastern and Western Europe also share some in-
teresting political, social and cultural characteristics. The first is the great change in 
the nature of the relations between state and society, particularly the disenchant-
ment - I would almost say Entzauberung (i.e. the loss of its `magic' power) - with 
the political arena as the lever for the reconstruction of society. Common to the 
original projects of modernity, especially after the French Revolution, throughout 
Europe and then in the East, was the belief that society be reconstructed by political 
belief, by political action, even by political utopias; different types of utopia, open 
and more closed, totalitarian or perhaps less totalitarian. This strong belief in the 
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primacy of the political arena has now been weakened and retransformed in both 
the West and the East. 
     This does not mean that the political arena itself has become weaker. In 
terms of the resources available to it, it has strengthened significantly. With much 
greater leverage available to state it is almost impossible to do anything in the so-call-
ed market economies, even in Western Europe, without state intervention. On the 
other hand, the state, the political arena, the center, has lost some of the charismatic 
qualities which were very strong in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One 
very interesting indicator is attachment to the army. The most dramatic illustration I 
have seen in recent years is Switzerland. Apart from the post office and the railways, 
the army is the only all-Swiss institution, and the first two are obviously less impor-
tant in forging Swiss society. A few years ago there was a referendum in Switzerland 
on the abolition of the army: thirty per cent of the population were in favor. In the 
same vein, soldiers are organizing themselves into trade unions in the Netherlands 
and elsewhere. Could we ever imagine the army of a proper nineteenth-century na-
tion state permitting its soldiers to form trade unions, let alone an electorate voting 
it out of existence? The point is that the political center has lost quite a lot of its 
charismatic power, not its administrative or financial power. 
     This can also be seen very clearly in the so-called new social movements (the 
ecological movement, the women's movement, regional movements) which are 
demanding resources from the center. They no longer want to reconstruct the center 
in a highly ideological way; rather, they want to move out of the center to create new 
autonomous areas for society, with less central control. This weakening of the sym-
bolic significance of the political arena, of the belief that politics can transform socie-
ty by itself, is also very strong in the East, of course. Take, for example, the eminent 
Hungarian writer Gyorgy Konrad, who was talking about leaving politics. Leaving 
political is also politics, but a different kind. This, in my opinion, is something com-
mon to the developments in both Western and Eastern Europe. 
     Closely related to this is the growing emphasis on civil society. Civil society 
has even become something of a slogan which is not always easy to define. The em-
phasis itself, however, is important and indicative. It is again a symbolic flight from 
the primacy of the political arena. In Western and Eastern Europe we have had this 
very strong emphasis on civil society for perhaps no more than ten years. Civil socie-
ty was scarcely mentioned as an analytical concept in social science discussions in the 
1950s, 1960s or 1970s. Suddenly it has reappeared. This is, in my view, a very in-
teresting indication of the diminishing position of the political arena, and it will also 
be seen to be very interesting when we come to compare Europe and India shortly. 
     Thus there are common elements in Eastern and Western Europe, common 
roots, and currently a common emphasis on civil society. There are more and more 
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common contacts, increasing 'Euro-globalization', to coin a phrase. The inter-
changes between different European countries, in both Western and Eastern 
Europe, are becoming ever closer at every level, economic, administrative, political 
and ideological. 
     At the same time all these modern societies differ greatly from one another. 
They are certainly not becoming all of a kind with minor local variations. What we 
are witnessing today, on a regional scale in Europe and also on a world scale, is the 
development of multiple modern societies or civilizations: or multiple cultural pro-
grams of modernity, as I would prefer to call them. The term `cultural' is used not in 
a narrow sense, but with very far-reaching institutional implications: different con-
ceptions of authority, institution-building and political economy. All these concep-
tions are basically modern, despite the differences between them. 
     This does not mean that their mutual relations are becoming more har-
monious. The older literature on development and modernization very often im-
plied that the more modern societies become, the more harmonious and cooperative 
their mutual relations will be. The real tension in that perspective was between tradi-
tional and modern, and the real struggle would thus be between these two. This is no 
longer a generally shared view. There are now many different modern societies and 
growing tensions between them, some of them due to conflicts of interest, but many 
also due to different cultural conceptions. 
     These conceptions differ as to the kind of modernity they want and how they 
see each other. To give one illustration, the international trade conflicts between the 
United States and Japan are not only trade conflicts, they are also sharp cultural con-
flicts about different conceptions of nationhood, internationl relations, ideology and 
so on. Trade conflicts cannot be understood in purely economic terms: the economic 
aspect is important, but it is insufficient to account for the actual conflicts. 
     In Europe and throughout the world we have growing globalization, growing 
contacts and the development of modern life, but different modes of modernity. It is 
not merely a question of different degrees of development, which exist whatever 
economic indices we measure them by. Cutting across these different degrees of 
development, however, are different cultural conceptions within modernity. 
   Take, for example, the nature of democracy in India, one of the most 
fascinating problems in the study of contemporary societies. In terms of population 
India is the greatest constitutional democracy in the world today. Most theories of 
democracy somehow fail to fit the Indian case. Apparently there is something wrong 
with the theories. This is a different type of democracy, but different from the Euro-
pean and American type. We often forget that the European and American 
democracies are also different; Japan has yet another type of constitutional 
democracy. All these types are democratic, all are constitutional, but the political 
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culture, the rules of the game (not so much the formal rules as the basic conceptions 
of authority, accountability and the like) are very different. 
     They are all modern, certainly not traditional, but they are influenced in 
many ways by the respective historical experience of these different societies. We 
have to look very closely at these historical experiences in order to understand the 
differences. 
III 
This view goes to some extent against the so-called convergence of modern society 
which was very prevalent in early studies of modernization. While truly enough with 
the passing of time, there developed in all these studies growing recognition of the 
possible diversity of transitional societies, it was still assumed that such diversity 
could disappear, as it were, at the end-stage of modernity. 
     But, as is well known, and as has been abundantly analyzed in the literature, 
the ideological and institutional developments in the contemporary world would 
have not upheld this vision, and the fact of the great institutional variability of 
different modern and modernizing societies - not only among the "transitional", 
but also among the more developed, even highly industrialized societies - became 
continuously more and more apparent, calling for a new perspective. Such a perspec-
tive was developed already twenty five years ago in Post-Traditional societies and 
taken up later in Patterns of Modernity (London 1988), and we would like to 
elaborate and systematize it now more fully. 
     Such perspective entails a far-reaching reappraisal of the vision of moderniza-
tion, of modern civilizations. Such reappraisal is based first of all on the recognition 
that the crystallization and expansion of modernity has to be viewed as the 
crystallization of a new type of civilization - not unlike the expansion of Great 
Religions, or great Imperial expansions in past times. But because the expansion of 
this civilization almost always combined very intensive economic, political, and 
ideological dimensions and forces, its impact on the societies to which it spread was 
much more intense than in most historical cases. 
     These considerations do not negate the obvious fact that in many central 
aspects of their institutional structure - be it in occupational and industrial struc-
ture, in the structure of education or of cities - very strong convergences have 
developed in different modern societies. 
     These convergences were above all manifest in the development of common 
problems - but the modes of coping with these problems differed greatly between 
these civilizations. These differences are attributable to a great variety of reasons -
such as, among others, the various historical contingencies, the historical timing of 
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the incorporation of different societies into the emerging international systems. But 
beyond all these reasons, even if in close relation to them, as the development of the 
new distinct cultural programmes of modernity which crystallized in these societies 
or civilizations. 
     Such different cultural programmes of modernity crystallized through the pro-
cess of a highly selective incorporation and transformation in these civilizations of 
the various premises of Western modernity. 
     All these selections that developed in these societies entailed different inter-
pretations of the basic cultural programme of modernity; they entailed different em-
phases on different components of these programmes - such as man's active role in 
the universe; the relation between Wertrationalitat and Zweckrationalitat; the con-
ceptions of cosmological time and its relation to historical time; the belief in pro-
gress; the relation of progress to history as the process through which the pro-
gramme of progress; the relations to the major utopian visions; and the relation bet-
ween the individual and the collectivity, between reason and emotions, and between 
the rational and the romantic and emotive, could be realized. 
     In many of these civilizations the basic meaning of "modernity" - its 
cultural historical programme - was quite different from its original Western vision 
rooted in the ideas of Enlightenment, of progress, of the unfolding of the great 
historical vision of reason and self realization of individuals, of social and in-
dividual emancipation. 
     While modernity was, within many of the non-Western societies, conceived 
as growing participation both on the internal and international scene in terms deriv-
ed from the ideas of equality and participation, the other dimensions - especially 
those of individual liberty, of social and individual emancipation and individual 
autonomy as closely related to the historical unfolding of reason, which were con-
stitutive of the Western European discourse on modernity from the Enlightenment 
on, were not necessarily always accepted. 
     These differences were not purely cultural or academic. They were closely 
related to some basic problems inherent in the political and institutional program-
mes of modernity. Thus, in the political realm, they were closely focused on the rela-
tions between the utopian and the civil components in the construction of modern 
politics; between "revolutionary" and "normal" politics, or between the general will 
and the will of all; between civil society and the state, between individual and collec-
tivity. 
     These different cultural programmes of modernity entailed also different con-
ceptions of authority and of its accountability, different modes of protest and of 
political activity. 
     Similarly, these different cultural programmes of modernity have also greatly 
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influenced the formation of other institutional arenas - as well as the overall percep-
tion of the place of these civilizations in the contemporary world. 
     These different cultural programmes of modernity were not shaped by what 
has been sometimes designated as the natural evolutionary potentialities of these 
societies; by the natural unfolding of their tradition, nor by their placement in the 
new international settings. Rather they were shaped by the continuous interaction 
between the cultural premises of these different societies; their historical experience; 
and the mode of impingement of modernity on them and of their incorporation into 
the modern political, economic, ideological world frameworks. 
     Or, in greater detail these different cultural programmes of modernity and 
their institutional patterns of coping were shaped by a combination; first of the basic 
premises of the civilizations and societies within which these institutions developed, 
i.e., by the basic definition of the relation between the cosmic and social orders; of 
the social and political orders; of authority, hierarchy and equality that were 
prevalent in them. Second, they were shaped by the structure of the elites and 
counter-elites, especially heterodoxies and movements of protest, which were 
predominant then, and by the modes of protest as articulated by different counter-
elites in different sectors of the society. 
Iv 
Two illustrations, one concerning Western Europe, the U.S. and Japan, and one 
relating to India and Europe, will indicate some of the problems. 
     The illustration touching on Europe, the United States and Japan goes back 
to a small book published eighty years ago by an eminent German economic 
historian, economist and sociologist, Werner Sombart, called Why is there no 
Socialism in the United States? Why did Sombart ask this question? Having a Euro-
pean background and coming from a highly industrialized capitalist country, he 
assumed that a natural reaction to - or development of - capitalism is some type of 
socialism. It may be reformist, or perhaps revolutionary, but it will become a major 
political force, not just a debating club for a handful of intellectuals, small groups 
of anarchists and so on. Then he looked at the United States, which was just becom-
ing a major industrial power. He saw no traces of socialism in the European sense 
although there were plenty of labor conflicts. These occur in any civilization, but the 
modes of the disputes were apparently very different. If Sombart had lived today, he 
could easily still have asked the same question. 
     Now he could also ask more or less the same question about Japan. While 
Japan does not have a socialist party, the similarity between it and any branch of 
European socialism (revolutionary, social democratic, etc.) is very sketchy. The 
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question, then, should perhaps be changed: instead of asking why there is no 
socialism in the United States and scarcely any in Japan, we should ask why there is 
socialism in Europe. The answer to this question may be that socialism neither was 
nor is, as Sombart assumed, the natural response to capitalism; it is the specific Euro-
pean response to capitalism, rooted in European political traditions and experience. 
If this is so, we have to look for different modes of expression of labor disputes in 
different places in order to understand the variety of modern civilizations. 
     Another closely connected element is the problem of civil society. Here it is 
very interesting to note that the caste system in India, a notion introduced by 
Westerners, starting with the English census of India, has performed many of the 
equivalent functions of civil society in Europe - not in the sense that it was based on 
conceptions of individual liberty, far from it, but in the sense that it was a highly 
autonomous force vis-a-vis the political rulers, but not necessarily favoring them. 
From a comparative point of view it is fascinating to consider the Indian caste 
system, that whole set of rituals with respect to family, kinship and regional rela-
tions, as a distinct type of civil society. 
     I call it a distinct type advisedly, because this brings me to a more general 
point on which I touched briefly when I discussed Europe. Civil society has become 
a slogan. The realities of civil society are very different in different European coun-
tries, and different yet again in other Western countries. Civil society in the United 
States, for instance, is an entirely different game from the one we play in Europe, 
and civil society in Sweden is very different from that in the Netherlands. 
     One of the characteristics of civil society in India concerns the relative 
weakness of the political arena, symbolically and organizationally. What we are 
witnessing today in India is that, while democracy in the sense of participation has 
become strongly rooted, there is a very great problem of governability. There were 
roots on which to graft participation, but the basis for building institutions to en-
sure governability was much shakier. This, in my opinion, is an important part of 
the Indian problematique. In Europe it may be the other way round: the conditions 
for governability are better rooted in elements in these modern societies, the ways in 
which they are being crystallized and coped with differ greatly. This can be related 
partly, but only partly, to the historical experience. 
V 
This applies also to the transition to market economy. Here also we do not see just 
an end of history, but the development of political economy, the market, that is win-
ning over all the others. This is true if the market is compared only to the old type of 
planned society or planned economy. It does not mean, however, that we shall be 
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left with only one type of political economy. There is no such thing as a `pure' 
market except in the thinking of some market fundamentalists. The United States, 
the closest approximation to the pure market that we know, has its Federal Reserve 
System, which regulates in some very interesting ways: some years ago, when the 
notorious crash of the savings and loans associations occurred, it was the state that 
had to step in and bail them out, at a price estimated by some as exceeding the 
United States' entire welfare budget. 
     The market is winning over centralized planning, but different types of 
political economy will develop based on different combinations of four basic 
elements: the market, regulation, intervention and welfare. What we see today 
throughout the world, I believe, is not just the spread of the market against all op-
position, although it is sometimes described as such. All over, at least, the problem 
is really how to combine these four elements in continually changing ways, because 
they cannot be the same in different historical circumstances in the same society -
and the experience of Japan and East Asia is of very great interest from this point of 
view. 
     We see the development not only of multiple cultural programs of modernity 
but also of multiple types of political economy. The components are similar in some 
ways; the way in which they come together, however, will be influenced not only by 
international relations, by globalization, but also by the internal political cultures of 
different societies. 
     This should be made absolutely explicit and should serve as the starting point 
for a sort of research programme. What are the different packages of development 
and social institutions which can develop in different places? What are the types of 
development, of political economy and of political regime, and how do they relate 
to social traditions? Development in the sense of an increase in productivity is a 
universal element; but there is no simple recipe for promoting it, combining it with 
other elements of modernity - neither for all societies nor for the same society in 
different periods. Historical periods are now changing very rapidly. It is not the end 
of history but rather the intensification of history. 
                           13
